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COME NOW Defendants and Appellants, TAYLOR SMITH an individual, and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and submit the following
Brief pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This appeal is subject to transfer by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(4).

The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals

any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction with some exceptions
not relevant in this case.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
Cases are transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court at Court's discretion not
otherwise subject to original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court effected the transfer by Order
dated November 10, 2005, effective 20 days from that date.
There are no other related appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Issues Presented on Appeal: Did the trial court appropriately grant Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment against the Defendants based upon its ruling that Rule
7(c)(3)(A), URCP, which provides in part that "....the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party?"
The court further found that the memorandum opposing summary judgment should "contain a
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verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a
separate statement of additional facts in dispute." The Court found no such facts in opposing
counsel's memorandum to be in dispute.
In appealing the trial court's ruling, Defendants/Appellants claim that the affidavit
of the Defendant is sufficient to raise issues of fact and/or law which warrant a refusal by the trial
court to grant the summary judgment relief requested. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191
(Utah, 1975).
Defendants/Appellants further argue that even where if they failed to point out
portions of the Plaintiffs memorandum facts which were in dispute, certainly, the affidavit in
opposition pointed out and highlighted those very facts. Hence this court has the authority to
deny summary judgment where the Plaintiff would not be entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law, i.e., where there were material facts which were in dispute. Ohvell v. Clark 658
P.2df585 (Utah, 1982).
Upon review of a grant of motion for summary judgment the Supreme Court
applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332
(Utah, 1977).
Standard of Review: On review of an order granting summary judgment, the
party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and
all inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him, Weinegar v.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2nd 104 (Utah, 1991).
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STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 7/27/04 in the above captioned action seeking the
following relief:
(A) A claim for breach of contract against the defendants claiming generally that
the Defendants agreed to pay Bluffdale for water service. (Record at page 12) No allegation was
made as to whether the agreement to pay was written or made orally.
(B) A claim based upon promissory estoppel was made claiming that (i)
Defendants promised to pay Bluffdale City for water service, (ii) that Bluffdale City relied on the
promise of payment to its financial detriment, (iii) the obligation to enforce the agreement is
necessary to avoid financial detriment, hence, (iv) the Defendants should be estopped from
denying the existence of a contract or that they owe Bluffdale City for water services under the
contract (never described as verbal or oral) (Record; at page 13).
( C ) A claim for unjust enrichment claiming that (I) Bluffdale City provided
water services to the Defendants (ii) that Defendants had knowledge of the benefits of water
services provided, (iii) that Defendants accepted the water services from Bluffdale City, (iv) that
to permit the Defendants to retain the benefits without compensation would constitute an
unconscionable and unjust enrichment to Defendants at Plaintiffs detriment and (v) Plaintiff has
suffered damage as a result of the unjust enrichment. (Record at page 14)
In response to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Defendants denied the
following:
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(1) That they asked for water services in July, 1999.
(2) That they received any water services from Bluffdale City.
(3) That they agreed to pay Bluffdale City for water services.
(4) That they have not paid Bluffdale City for water services.
(5) That they breached a contract with Bluffdale City to pay for water services.
(6) That Bluffdale City has been damaged in the amount of $11,385.62, as a
result of Defendant's failure to pay for water services.
(7) That they owe Bluffdale City money pursuant to a contract. (Record at pages
17-19)
Via a verified response to interrogatories, S. Taylor Smith, for himself and
Wallingford Development, stated:
"The claims of Plaintiff against the Defendants are without merit.
Defendants have no responsibility to provide water to the property
belonging to the Plaintiff, contractual or under any other theory of
relief. In addition, the parties have resolved any and all claims
against one another by virtue of a global settlement." (Record at
page 117-118).

S. Taylor Smith also stated under oath:
"Taylor Smith only represented S.K. Development before
Bluffdale City; however, he was never personally responsible
under any contractual relationship. S.K. Development
subsequently settled and claims Bluffdale City had against it."
(Record at pages 117-118)

The Defendants further claimed in their answers to interrogatories that Bluffdale City
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provided the water for the parking strip which belonged to Bluffdale City and not the Defendants.
(Record at page 11)
In Brent Bluth's Affidavit dated April 26, 2005 in support of Plaintiff s Motion and
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, Mr. Bluth avers that as overseer of Bluffdale
City's Water Department, that in approximately July, 1999, Taylor Smith, the Defendant, on
behalf of himself and his company, Wallingford Development, asked Bluffdale for water service.
(Record at pages 56-57)
He further asserted that Bluffdale expected to be paid for water services provided to the
Defendants, and sent water bills to the Defendants, but they went unpaid. He further asserted
that the Defendants knew that the Plaintiff expected payment from between July 1, 199 to
October 2, 2001, but despite this knowledge, the Defendants refused to pay. (Record at page 57)
In his Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 26,
2005, Shane Jones stated that S. Taylor Smith on behalf of Wallingford Development and
himself, agreed to pay Bluffdale City for water services. Further he stated the Declaration of
Covenants for Heritage Industrial Park recorded on January 29, 1998, stated "that the owner is to
provided irrigation for all planting areas and landscaping including City parkstrips of the
commercial site. See Declaration of Covenants page 28, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"."
(Record at page 50)
He further claimed that on September 9, 1999 he sent Taylor Smith a letter
memorializing the agreement." (Record at pages 50, 54)
In Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of S.
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Taylor Smith in Support of the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, Mr. Smith effectively denies all of the allegations which Mr. Bluth and Mr. Jones
made in their assertions in favor of the Motion for Summary Judgment. For example, Mr. Smith
states in his affidavit in opposition that at no time did he either for himself or on behalf of
Wallingford Development agree to pay Bluffdale City for water services for the park strip in
question. He claims that although he was approached several times by representatives of
Bluffdale City to sign an agreement to pay for water services, he refused each time. (Record at
pages 117-118)
He further states that the letter referred to by Ms. Jones dated September 9, 1999 was sent
to him after he has refused to pay for water services, hence, there could not be any agreement to
pay for water services or inferences to pay for water services. (Record at page 118)
He further claims that the Restrictive Covenants referred to by Mr. Jones was not between
himself, personally, and the Bluffdale City . (Record at page 118)
Additionally, he states that neither he nor Wallingford Development were signators on the
Restrictive Covenants (Record at pages 117-118)
Finally, he states there is a "global settlement of all claims" to which Bluffdale City is a
signator and which should inure to the benefit of the Defendants as against Bluffdale City's
claims in this case. (Record at page 118)
These allegations of the Plaintiff via affidavit and cross-affidavits of the Defendants set
up conflicting material issues of fact which require testimony and a decision by a trier of fact,
and which further prevent entry of an order of summary judgment.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON
APPEAL
Determinative law: Rule 56, URCP, Rule 7(c)(3)(A), URCP; Rule 7(c)(3)(B),
URCP.
Rule 56, URCP: "A party seeking to recover upon a claim....may at any time
after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action....move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment...."
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein...When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial...."
Rule 7(c)(3)(A), URCP: " A memorandum supporting a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party."
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Rule 7(c)(3)(B), URCP: "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials such as
affidavits or discovery materials."
Section 25-5-4(l)(b): 'The following agreements are void unless the agreement,
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party charged with
the agreement: ....(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order by the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff/Appellee and against the Defendants/Appellants on a claim for water service from
July, 1999 to October, 2001 for $10,241.71, plus late penalty fees in the sum of $3,404.11, plus
interest.
The decision of the trial court in awarding the Plaintiff Summary Judgment was
entered November 7, 2005.
This appeal was filed November 7, 2005.
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Factual Summary:
In 1998, Mr. Steven Sinner through his corporation, SK Development, and S.
Taylor Smith, through his corporation, Wallingford Development and/or Meridian Development,
formed a joint venture for the purpose of developing a 29-lot "industrial park", called "The
Heritage Industrial Park, in Bluffdale, Utah. The relative "ownership" of shares of the two
entities were derived by the number of lots each business entity would own following the platting
thereof. SK Development owned 15/29 or 15 lots and Wallingford owned 14/29 or 14 lots. SK
Development, on behalf of the joint venture, signed all of the agreements with Bluffdale City and
others.
As part of the development approval process, SK Development was obligated as required
by Bluffdale City Ordinance, to provide "bonding" to guarantee the installation of the public
improvements (streets, paving, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, and so forth.) If the
improvements were so installed, inspected and accepted by the City, the "bond' after being held
for a one-year guarantee period to assure the installed improvement would be durable and lasting,
would be released by the City in case the developer failed to fully install the "public
improvements", as required by the City.
The Plaintiff, Bluffdale City, alleged in its amended complaint dated July 24,
2004, that Defendants, Taylor Smith and/or Wallingford Development, Inc. (Wallingford)
received water services from Bluffdale in approximately July, 1999 through October, 2001, when
it was discontinued, and refused to pay for them.

The Plaintiff is sought $ 10,241.71 in water

fees plus penalties from Bluffdale for water services allegedly provided.
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Further, Bluffdale alleged that it had a written contract with the Defendants to
provide water service to them. As support for this proposition, Bluffdale alleges that
Wallingford signed the Restrictive Covenants which state that the owner of the property is to
provide "irrigation for all planting areas, all landscaping, including park strips of its Commercial
Site." Thus, Bluffdale concluded that Wallingford had a contractual duty under the Restrictive
Covenants to provide irrigation to the park strips of its commercial development, regardless of
who owned the park strips, including Bluffdale.
In his affidavit in opposition to Bluffdale's motion for summary judgment, Smith averred
that though approached several times by Bluffdale's agent, Shane C. Jones, to sign an agreement
to set a meter and to pay for water on the park strips, he refused each time to do so, and that he
never agreed to Jones' letter of understanding dated September 9, 1999 regarding payment for
water on the parking strips. Bluffdale admits there was no written agreement between Smith,
Wallingford and Bluffdale to pay for water on the park strips but, instead alleges that the
Restrictive Covenants, obligated it and/or Smith to pay for water usage on the park strips
regardless of who owned the park strips.
There is no evidence adduced that Smith, individually, signed the Restrictive Covenants
or agreed to be personally liable for water services allegedly rendered by Bluffdale to the park
strips. (See Attachment "G")
Further, Smith denies the legal conclusion drawn by Bluffdale that the Restrictive
Covenants represent an implied promise on his part to pay for water usage or obligation to pay
Bluffdale for water usage.
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Next, Bluffdale asserts that the settlement between SK Development and
Bluffdale dated May 20, 2004 did not render the lawsuit in question moot, that it was not a
"global settlement",and was only intended to resolve issues between SK Development and
Bluffdale in Civil No. 020401195, and not as to Smith and Wallingford.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There remain factual issues which prevent the granting of summary judgment in this case.
The trial court's decision and order granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendants should be ordered reversed for the following reasons:
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7( c )(3) (B)Rule has been substantially complied with
in that the affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment effectively refuted every material
fact which the Plaintiff claim supports is motion for summary judgment.
B. A factual issue remains as to whether or not there was an agreement between the
parties (verbal or otherwise) wherein the Defendants agreed to pay for water services for the
parking strips in question.
C A factual issues whether the Defendants have been unjustly enriched by provision of
water on the parking strips in question.
D The Defendant, S. Taylor Smith, was never personally a party to any agreement to
agree to pay for water services on the parking strips in question and/or a party to the Restrictive
Covenants which allegedly require the Wallingford Development to pay for water services.
E.. There exists a global settlement between Bluffdale City and/or the Defendants which
stands as a defense to any payment of water services.
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ARGUMENT
I
DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY
COM PLIED WITH RULE 7( c ) (3) (B), URCP
While Rule 7(c)(3)(B), URCP provides that a memorandum opposing a motion for
summary judgment is to contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that
is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute, those facts
can be controverted by affidavits and other discovery materials.
In this case the memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment alleged
claims of the Plaintiff which were controverted by the Defendants and which also was supported
by an affidavit which essentially controverted by sworn testimony each allegation contained in
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. While no reference was made to page numbers,
references were made to the Complaint and Affidavits of Plaintiffs The court should find that the
Defendants are in substantial compliance with the rule and that there is precedence to allow the
court to do so.. Owell, ID.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT
(VERBAL OR OTHERWISE) TO PAY PLAINTIFF
FOR WATER PROVIDED
The Plaintiff alleges through if affiants, Mr. Bluth and Mr. Jones, that the Defendants,
Mr. Smith, and Wallingford Development, through Mr. Smith, agreed to pay for Bluffdale City's
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water services. No allegation was ever made, nor were there any exhibits produced to show that
either Smith or Wallingford ever agreed in writing to pay for water services. Apparently, the
Plaintiff was basing its claim upon oral assurances by the Defendants of their intent to make
payments for the park strip in question, and this was sufficient to support claims in contract,
estoppel and unjust enrichment.
But these assertions by the Plaintiff that the Defendants have agreed to pay for water
services, albiet, oral in nature, are soundly refuted by the responses to request for admission, the
verified responses to interrogatories and the Affidavit of S. Taylor Smith in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
Before the trial court can grant a motion for summary judgment, the party against whom
the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all inferences fairly
arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him. Weinegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
P.2nd 104 (Utah, 1991). So too, with this Honorable Court. It must review all inferences from
the affidavits of the Defendants, and the responses to discovery in a light most favorable to the
Defendants. Doing so would compel a reversal of the trial court's order granting summary
judgment.
Ill
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENDANTS WERE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED
BY PLAINTIFF HAVING PROVIDED WATER
TO THE PARKING STRIPS
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The "unjust enrichment" claim of the city is a claim that the Defendants requested water
services, were provided with water services, knew that the Plaintiff anticipated payment for the
water, and thus by having provided water services, the Defendants were unjustly enriched by
having received water from the city to water the city's parking strips.
The argument fails, ever, because the parking strips belonged to the city and not to the
Defendants, and if anyone was enriched by the provision of water to the parking strips, it was
Bluffdale City. The waters were utilized to water grass and other vegetation along the parking
strips in a dedicated "public" street right-of-way. Arguably, action of attempting to collect
monies from a private party for waters used to water a public use parking strip, particularly after
the parking strips had been formally dedicated to the city, amounts to an unlawful taking
protected under the United States Constitution and by the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Additionally, the when after repeated demands for payment, the Plaintiff had a duty to
mitigate any damages it claims to have incurred, which it failed to apparently do. It provided
water services for nearly two years without any payment.
IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS A MATERIAL
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENDANT, S. TAYLOR SMITH, WAS EVER
PERSONALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY THE
PLAINTIFF'S WATER BILL
In responses to interrogatories dated Marcy 21, 2005, S. Taylor Smith, for himself and on
behalf of Wallingford Development, Inc., averred under oath that neither he nor Wallingford
Development ever agreed to pay for water services on the city's parking strip, as was claimed by
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Bluffdale City. Additionally, in his Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant Smith averred that neither he for himself, nor on behalf of Wallingford
Development, ever requested water service from the Plaintiff, Bluffdale City. (See Affidavit of
S. Taylor Smith in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, page 2) This is
indirect contradiction to Plaintiffs allegation that "in approximately July, 1999, defendant,
Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and his company, Defendant, Wallingford Development,
requested water service from Bluffdale." (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, page 2)
Such a conflict in the alleged facts raises an issue for the trier of fact, and one upon which
the court could rely in denying the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
Additionally, Smith alleges in the same Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment that though approached several times by Bluffdale City to agree for payment
of water services, he refused to enter into any such agreement. The question is raised: If
Bluffdale knew of Smith's refusal to pay, why did they keep the water on for more than a year
after September 9,1999 and continue charging Smith and/or Wallingford for the water service?
Furthermore, the Restrictive Covenants upon which the Plaintiff says it relies, are one in
which the Defendant, Smith, was not a party personally. If this is the case, how could the court
hold him personally liable?
Finally, any alleged obligation of Smith to answer for the obligation of Wallingford is
void and violates the Statute of Frauds (Section 25-5-4((l)(b), since admittedly, the obligation
was allegedly arose out of Restrictive Covenants, to which Smith was not personally a party, and
since it was never in writing, even if the court were to believe Smith made a promise to pay.
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V
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE REMAINS THE PARTIES
ENTERED INTO A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT OF
ALL CLAIMS INCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
FOR WATER REIMBURSEMENT
As part of a lawsuit captioned SK Development vs. Bluffdale City, the parties, including
Wallingford Development entered into a mutual release of claims. The Mutual Release stated in
relevant party:
4. Mutual Release of All Claims. "As part of this Agreement,
Developer and City, for and behalf of themselves and their
respective owners, employees, agents, indemnitors, insurers,
successors, and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge
each other, together with their owners, employees, agents,
indemnitors, insurers, successsors, and assigns, from any and all
claims, demands, liabilities, damages, causes of action, costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or in any way
connected with the Litigation. Its is the intent of the parties to
fully and completely release each other from any and all claims in
any way related to the Litigation as more fully described therein. If
is further understood that this Agreement has been entered into by
the parties for the purpose of compromising disputed claims and
shall not be construed as an admission of wrongdoing or liability on
the part of any of the parties, and any such liability or wrongdoing is
expressly denied." (Emphasis mine)

Since SK Development was a party to this release, and was one of the joint venturers
involved in the development of Heritage Industrial Park, it can be inferred that this Agreement
has been entered into by the parties for the purpose of compromising of compromising of the
$10,000+ for culinary charges arising from the Heritage Industrial Park development; namely,
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those "waters" (and/or the availability thereof, even if there weren't any waters actually utilized")
together with "late fees" for the delinquent payment thereof, for the "park strip" vegetation
installed as part of the Industrial Park development, after formal "dedication" of the
improvement (at the plat recordation stage), but prior to the city's "final release of the
"improvement bond."
The Plaintiff suggests that the release does not relate the their claim for damages against
the Defendants for water usage of the parking strip. The term "the Litigation", as used in the
mutual release should not, however, be so narrowly construed as to prevent a release of the city's
water claim. To do so would frustrate the very purposes and whole concept of a "general
release." The term "the Litigation" should be interpreted broadly so as to include all claims,
present or prospective, plead or not, which might have been filed or claimed at the time of the
signing of the release.
Utah Case law supports the foregoing construction. In Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d
404, 285 P2d 839 (Utah, 1955) the court concluded a counterclaim not presented to the court on
a matter involving the same transaction is forever barred. In Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P2d 714
(Utah, 1985), the court held that a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction, that was
subject of the other lienholder's claim was compulsory and failure to file a counterclaim resulted
in a waiver of that claim.
Similarly, in this case, when the parties and their "agents" (e.g. Wallingford
Development) negotiated a release, prepared by Bluffdale City, against whom construction must
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be construed, the "release" works not only for the benefit of SK Development buy also its agent,
Wallingford . The determinative factor is not whether Bluffdale City plead the water claim
against SK Development, but whether it should have plead the claim, and did not.
To allow Bluffdale City to hold their "culinary water claim" hidden in its hip
pocket offends there very principles of law, contractual or otherwise, and which make the general
release a viable offense to the claims of the Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
There are several issues of fact which remain to be decided by a trier of fact that have not
been admitted to in these proceedings, and which warrant this Court in reversing the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants. Facts which
remain to be decided by the trier of fact include:
A. Whether or not there was an agreement between the parties (verbal or otherwise)
wherein the Defendants agreed to pay for water services for the parking strips in question.
B. Whether the Defendants have been unjustly enriched by provision of water on the
parking strips in question.
C. Whether the Defendant, S. Taylor Smith, was ever personally a party to any
agreement to agree to pay for water services on the parking strips in question and/or a party to the
Restrictive Covenants which allegedly require the Wallingford Development to pay for water
services.
D. Whether there was a global settlement between Bluffdale City and/or the Defendants
which would create a defense to any payment of water services.
Page 23 of 33

Dated t h i s ^ ^ day of March, 2006.

p/ i.
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS'
BRIEF ON APPEAL to Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee

tinsXl

addressed as follows:
DALE GARDINER
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
Attorneys at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
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day of March, 2006,

ADDENDUM
The following are attached:
(A) The order granting summary judgment from which this appeal is taken.
(B) The notice of appeal.
( C ) Settlement Agreement dated May 20, 2004 between SK Development, Inc.
and Bluffdale City.
( D ) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment.
( E ) Defendants' Reply Memorandum Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment
and Affidavit in Support Thereof.
( F ) Jones proposed letter of understanding dated September 9, 1999.
(G) Restrictive Covenants
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ATTACHMENT "A"
Order Granting Summary Judgment
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Third Juc^r&ai District

SAi.7 LASCH C O U N T V v ^ - ,

DALE GARDINER (#1147)
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451)
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
60 East South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

By—

KL<L
Deputy Clttk

ENTERED; IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS'.-^
DATE

Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS TAYLOR SMITH
AND WALLINGFORD
DEVELOPMENT, INC.

vs.

TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation
Defendants.

Civil No. 040914276
Judge Atherton

The Court having granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and good cause
appearing therefore,finaljudgment is entered as follows:
1.

Judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiff Bluffdale City and against Defendant

Taylor Smith, an individual, and Defendant Wallingford Development, Inc., a Utah Corporation,
i and'

in the amount of $11,997.05 for breach of contract and thereafter post-judgment interest at the
statutory rate until paid in full; and
2.

Judgment is awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants for costs in the

amount of $240.00, for a total judgment of $12,237.05.
3.

It is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of

reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting the judgment by execution or otherwise
as shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this % day of

'fUihr.

, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

erton
Approved as to form

David K. Smith

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS TAYLOR SMITH AND WALLINGFORD
DEVELOPMENT, INC. was served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the \*$*
day of October, 2005 to the following:
David K. Smith
6925 Union Park Center
Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047

3

ATTACHMENT "B
Notice of Appeal
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? 11 r

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Utah State Bar No. 2993
Suite 600
6925 Union Park Center
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763

f'T

_7

1 • !,P

L
li -• i-'
'U
CI

J o

I "rhiy

Attorney for Defendants: S. TAYLOR SMITH, an individual, and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
A Utah Corporation

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,

'

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

)

Case No. 040914276

TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

)

Honorable Judith Atherton

Defendants.

COME N OW the Defendants, TAYLOR SMITH, an individual, and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and appeal the
Judgment and the whole thereof entered in the above-captioned proceeding on or about
October 13, 2005.

1

CUkK

riiCl

DATED this

I day of November, 2005.

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
Fax: (801) 566-8763

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE
OF APPEAL to Counsel for the Plaintiff this _ l

day of November, 2005 addressed

as follows:

DALE GARDINER
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
60 East South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
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ATTACHMENT "C
Settlement Agreement dated May 20,2004
between SK Development, Inc. and Bluffdale City

Page 29 of 33

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND MUTUAL GENERAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

SK Development, Incorporated, a Utah corporation ("Developert), and Bluffdale
City, a municipality and political subdivision of die State of Utah ("City")] hereby enter
into this Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release of All Claims if the
"Agreement") as of this 70 day of
y^p.
., 2004, for the purpose of
settling and resolving certain claims, controversies, disputes, and legal actidns between diem
ies
on die terms and conditions and for the considerations set forth below.

f-

1.
Intent of the Parties. Developer commenced a legal action iii tne Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 020401195, assigned
to the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg asserting various claims regarding bond agreements
for the completion of improvements in the Heritage Industrial £ark Subdivision. The City
filed an Answer and Counterclaim with respect to diose same issues (collectively the
"Litigation"). It is the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement to fully settle,
compromise and resolve all claims, controversies and disputes between thein arising out af
or in any way related to the Litigation, resulting in the dismissal of the Litigation with
prejudice and upon the merits.
2.
Dismissal of the Litigation. The parties hereby agree that a stipulation,
motion and order of dismissal will be executed by counsel for Developer and the City and
filed with the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Iptah, in Civil
No. 020401195, dismissing the Litigation with prejudice and upon the merits, with all
parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
3.
Payment for Completion of Improvements. As part of this Agreement,
Developer pays concurrently with the execution and/or delivery of this Agreement the sum
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) for the completion of any public improvements which
are associated with the claims of both parties as more fully set forth in the litigation. In
consideration of the receipt of the $10,000, Bluffdale City fully and immecjiately releases the
"bonds33 (in whatever form and surety) and discharges the obligations thereunder, including
any obligation of the surety, for all phases (1, 2 and 3) of the Heritage Industrial Park, as
follows:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 3

United Fire and Casualty Company "bond," dated as of 6/8/99
First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account Mumber
254-10249-11
First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account [number
254-10254-13
First Security Bank (now Wells Fargo Bank) account number
254-1025991

To the extent that the "bonds'3 are actually trust accounts held by the designated financial
institutions (and/or their successor-in-interest, i.e., Wells Fargo Bank), those financial
institutions are authorized and directed to immediately release all monies contained in the
accounts to the depositor thereof (i.e., SK Development and/or WallingfoJd Development).
An original copy of this Agreement (or a photocopy thereof) shall be suffidient authority for
the surety to immediately release said funds to the depositor, notwithstanding any other
provisions within the contractual documents or Bluffdale City ordinances to the contrary
(pertaining to the release of the bonds and/or for the documentation necessary to
implement said release).
4.
Mutual General Release of All Claims. As part of this Agreement, Developer
•and City, for and on behalf of themselves and the respective owners, employees, agents,
indemnitors, insurers, successors, and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge each
other, together with their owners, employees, agents, indemnitors, insurers, successors, and
assigns, from any and all. claims, demands, liabilities, damages, causes of action, costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees, arising out of or in any way connected with the
Litigation. It is the intent of the parties to fully and completely release each other from any
and all claims in any way related to the Litigation as more fully described therein. It is
further understood that this Agreement has been entered into by the parties for the purpose
of compromising disputed claims and shall not be construed as an admission of wrongdoing
or liability on the part of any of the parties, and any such liability or wrongdoing is
expressly denied
5.
Integration. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and
understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter herein, and integrates all
prior conversations, discussions or undertakings of whatever kind or naturq and may only
be modified by a subsequent writing duly executed by the parties hereto.
6.
Counterparts. Tliis document may be executed in one or mQre counterparts,
which together shall constitute one and the same document,
WHEREFORE, the parties have executed the foregoing to be effective the date first
appearing above.
SK DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED

Byits

^ZEgmgXir-

BLUFFDALE C n y

Attest:
cr, Mayor

X

B.

Bluffdale City RecWer

Approved as to form-

Hpmcr
"neyfor SKDevelopmaii I u

'V^A^A^T^
JodjKl lurnc
\rtorni/for BJufidait ULy
113081 1

ATTACHMENT "D
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
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DALE GARDINER (#1147)
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451)
PARRY ANDERSON & GAR I >l \ > •
60 East South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-3434
Attorney, lor riuinutt Biuikialc i ily

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT I.AKK ( Ol'N l'\ . ST ATI OF V

BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,
Piaintin,

BLUFFDALE CITY'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual...
WALLINGFORD DI-\ (I - >PVI \
a I!';>.'-•• Corporal i. i
Defendants.

C i ' il Phi H l l ) l ) ! 4 : 7 ( i

Judge Atherton

Pursuant to Rules 7(c)(3)(A) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff

this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
Defendants asked for water service from Bluffdale in approximately July, 1999. It is
undisputed that Bluffdale provided water service to Defendants and that Defendants have refused
to pay for it. This Court should order that Defendants pay for the water service which was
provided by Bluffdale.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Bluffdale is a Utah municipal corporation which provides water services for its

residents. See Amended Complaint at H 3 and Answer to Complaint ^ 2.
2.

In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and

his company, Defendant Wallingford Development, requested water service from Bluffdale. See
Affidavit of Shane Jones at ^ 5 (attached hereto as Exhibit "A").
3.

Bluffdale agreed to provide water services to Defendants. See Jones Aff. at f 6.

4.

Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water services it provided to Defendants.

See Jones Aff. at f 7.
5.

Bluffdale sent water bills to Defendants but they were not paid. See Affidavit of

Brent Bluth at p (attached hereto as Exhibit "B").
6.

Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water

services. See Jones Aff. at ^ 8. See also Bluth Aff. at % 9.

2

j

The Declaration of Covenants for Heritage Industrial Park, the development

which received the water services which is the subject of this matter, state that the owner is to
j 1111\ in lr iiiiujilinii li'nn iill pl,inlni|> area'.

.IIKI

lannlsi/apii!)"1 in* lmliii|> l 'ily park s f ™ if is nil llir

commercial site. See Junes AH", at f 9.
8.

I;.. .^cpiwiw.^i -. 1999, Bluffdale City engineer,

>AI„.^

Jones sent a letter to

Defendant Taylor Smith memorializing the agreement that he (Taylor Smith), "as the developer
will be responsihk to pa> for the water that is used until each lot has its own irrigation system
and the system -.
9.

•*

.

t

. • _ . -1 .

Alternatively, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water

services it provided to Defendants, Sec Tones .\H j 10.'

Bli iffdal* MI ;lie-

-,••!• i !> i . ! • ... - I

- -

•

^

. •.

s

they received, See Jones Aff. -i; \ • : See also Bluth Aff at f 11
11.

Bluffdale provided "\ \ ater ser\ ices to Defendants from Jul) 1, 1.999 to October 2,

2001. See Amended Complaint at f 3 and Answer to Complaint admitting this allegation at f 2
(attached hereto as Exhibit "C"). See also Affidavit of Brent Bluth at f 12.
12.

Despite receipt of sei • eral n< Dtices of delinqi i = fit payment, Defe ndants ha^ 're refi lsed

to pay for the water services they received from Bluffdale. See Amended Complaint at ]] 7 and
Answer to Complaint '| 6. See also Bluth / Iff, at 'f 13

13.

Defendants have incurred water services charges in the sum of $ 11,997.05 for

water services provided by Bluffdale. See also Bluth Aff. at f 15.
I.

BLUFFDALE IS ENTITLED TO ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
A.

Standard of Review for Motions for Summary Judgment.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added). "A major purpose of
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to
determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). Rule 56 is "designed toward
effectuating an inexpensive and expeditious determination of litigation;" accordingly, summary
judgment is appropriate to achieve this goal where there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. See Aetna Loan Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ofMd9 22 Utah 2d 252, 255, 346 P.2d 1078,
1079 (Utah 1959).
Accordingly, "[t]he trial judge not only can but should grant a motion for summary
judgment if he feels certain that he would rule that way no matter what proof a party could
produce in support of his contentions." Pioneer Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Pioneer Finance &
Thrift Co., 18 Utah 2d 106, 109, 417 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1966)(emphasis added). The grounds
4

for this motion are that the pleadings on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact,

tjpt.t^iv onriched. Specifically, it is undisputed that Defendants requested water service from,.
Biutidule, Bluffdale provided water service to Defendants and Defendants have failed to pay for
the \ \ ater sen ices pro\ ided
B. • First < ;. or Relief
Water Services

ih h-ndants Breached rheir Contract to Pi t) foi

prove the following: (1) a contract; (2) performance by the party seeking recovery; (3) breach of
the contract by the other party; and (4) damages. See />w</ > Axmn
392 (I Itah 2001) Based on the i indisputed fac

T,\^/L

, , ( . :o ; •„ ,,;,,

^K/IV ; * iu genuine issue of material lact as to

each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for breach of contract as alleged in the
complaint.
As set forth above, Bluffdale had an oral agreement with Defendants to provide water
services to Defendants property, Bluffdale has fully performed its obligations under the
Agreement b> pro < • iding w ater sei v ices to Defendai its Defendants ha\ e breached their
obligations under the Agreement by not paying for the water services and Bluffdale has been

because Defendants have failed to fulfill all of their ob^.'atiuiis under the agreement.

C.

Second Claim for Relief- Defendants Have Been Unjustly Enriched.

In order to establish an unjust enrichment cause of action under Utah law, a plaintiff must
prove the following three elements: (1) a benefit was conferred on one person by another; (2)
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit; and (3) there must be acceptance or
retention by the conferee of benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value. See Groberg v. Housing
Opportunities, Inc. 2003 UT App \ 21, 68 P.3d 1015. Based on the undisputed facts, there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for unjust
enrichment as alleged in the complaint.
Bluffdale conferred the benefit of water services upon Defendants. Bluffdale provided
these water services to the Defendants with the understanding and expectation that Defendants
would pay for the same. Defendants had knowledge of receiving the benefit of the water services
from Bluffdale. Defendants accepted and retained the benefit of the water services from
Bluffdale. To permit Defendants to retain the benefit of Bluffdale's water services without
compensating Bluffdale for those services would constitute an unconscionable and unjust
enrichment of Defendants at Bluffdale's expense. Thus, Bluffdale's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted because Defendants have been unjustly enriched.

6

D.

Third Claim for Relief - Defendants Impliedly Pn >missed to Pay Bluffdale.for the
Water Services and Bluffdale Relied on this Promise to its Detriment
In order to establish a promissory estoppel cause of action 1 incU r t It; ill k\ \ , c ij: laintiff

must prove the following: (1) a promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) reasonable
reliance inducing action or forbearance on part, of promisee; and (3) detriment to promisee. See

is no genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements of Bluffdale's cause of action for
promissory estoppel as alleged in the complaint.
A s set foi tli abo1' • e,, Defendants promised1 to pay Bluffdale for the water services.
Defendants did foresee or reasonably should have foreseen that Bluffdale would rely upon
Defendants j :

• w hen Bluffdale agreed to \

service. Bluffdale reasonably relied upon Defendants' promise to pay for the water services to
Bluffdale's financial detriment ' Bluffdale gave Defendants $11,997.05 worth of water services

estoppel to enforce Defendants'' promised, but unfulfilled, obligations to pay for the water
service. Miruiei, ueiukiaiiLS should be estopped hum lai) my (lie existence ol a eouliad ei (lul
they owe Bluffdale money pursuant to that contract.

Defendants' promise is an implied promise to pay for the water services as evidenced by their receipt of
water services. Anyone who receives water services expects to and should pay for those services. See BLACK'S LAW
th
DICTIONARY 755 (6 ed. 1990) ("Implied Promise. Fiction which the law creates to render one liable on contract
theory so as to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment,")
;

CONCLUSION
Defendants received water from Bluffdale and refused to pay it. Because there is no
genuine dispute of these dispositive facts, summary judgment should be entered granting all of
Bluffdale's claims.
DATED this / °lP day of April, 2005.
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER

)ALE GARDINER
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BLUFFDALE
CIT

MOTTOM H)K SIIMM v m HUMJMENTwas

served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the ^
following:

David K.Smith
6925 Union Park Center
Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047
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I

day . >l April, 2005 to the

DALE GARDINER (#1147)
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451)
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
60 East South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City

IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SHANE JONES

vs.

Civil No. 040914276
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation

Judge Atherton

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1.

Shane Jones, having first been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

2.

I am over the age of 21, have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein,

and can competently testify thereto.

3.

I am the Bluffdale City (the "City") Engineer.

4.

I have been intimately involved with the Defendants and their construction and

operation of I leritage Industrial Park.
5.

In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smiih. on behalf of himself and

his company, u ^ n u o n i Wallingford Development (hereinafter co..vdivci* . )cicndanu> '),
requested water service from Bluffdale.
6.

Bluffdale agreed to provide water services to Defendants.

7.

Bit iffdale expected to be paid fc i the "w ate r se i i ic ss it pro11' ide d to Defendants

8.

Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water

services.
9.

r

"

">

"> •»»

- H s lor I leril

' *

J

29. 1098 state that the owner is to provide irrigation for all planting areas and landscaping
including City parkstrips of the commercial site. See Declaration ^ , avenants page JX aiiachv,,
hereto as Exhibit "A."
10.

On September 9, 1999,1 sent Defendant Taylor Smith a letter memorializing our

each lot has its own irrigatioii system and the system serving the complete development can be
abandoned,

^ a seller dated ^eptembu *K lc^'> hum

hereto as Exhibit "B."

2

MUIHC Jones

to Taylor Smith attached

11.

Because of this, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water

services it provided to Defendants.
12.

Bluffdale relied upon the fact that Defendants would pay for the water services

they received.
DATED this $ (p day of April 2005.

<£2^c~e_

\/&^><jb<?

Shane Jones

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this o3k

TEDDIEK.BELL
<S^*V
ufWmW\ NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH
BMEMM M X 7 5 s o y ^ REDWOOD WX
BUflTOALE UT 04065
.
My ComrfcExp. 09/02/200? 1

Notary Public

3

day of April, 2005.

^—'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Al< HIM Vll ' M'

3Q4
SHA

•

April, 2005 to t h e

\1 : I

following:

mi i nl I1 " HI ni ni Ih
Utiiuii I1 irk Center
• 600
ak', Ul.ihX'KMV
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<U^c prepaid on the ^

f

day of

DALE GARDINER (#1147)
CRAIG R. KLEINMAN (#8451)
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
60 East South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bluffdale City

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT BLUTH

vs.
Civil No. 040914276
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah Corporation

Judge Atherton

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1.

Brent Bluth, having first been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

2.

I am over the age of 21, have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein,

and can competently testify thereto.

3.

•I

4.

bluffdale City (\hv "City" | Administrative Services Director.

I oversee the City's Water Department and I am well familiar with Defendants'

failure to pay their water bill.
5.

'

In approximately July, 1999, Defendant Taylor Smith, on behalf of himself and

his company, Defendant Wallingford Development, asked BlufMale for water servia .
6. .

Bluffdale agreed to pro\ Iciei, « ater ser vices tc! Defendants

7.

Bluff (dale expected to be paid for the water services it provided to Defendants.

8. . ' Bluffdale sent water bills to Defendants but they were not paid, See examples ol
i, v atei bills attached her eto as E: diibit" i L r
9.

•

' •

Defendants agreed to pay for the water services and they did not pay for the water

services.
10.

Alternatively, Defendants knew that Bluffdale expected to be paid for the water

services it provided to Defendants.
11.

Rltiffclalc relied \\\Utn |L tin I thai I leleinLmh would pa\ for (he water services

they received.
12

Hllutiikile pi'ouiled water services to Delendaub In >» <i|>pn>> im.ilel ; l"il ; I I"1' i"'1*

to October 2, 2001.
13.

Despite receipt of several notices of delinquent payment, Defendants have refused

to pay foi the water set v ices v hich the) received froi i I Bh iffdale

2

14.

Defendants currently owe Bluffdale $11,997.05 for unpaid water services.

15.

This amount will continue to increase as interest continues to accrue.

DATED this ^ L day of April, 2005.

;dkr3dfe*£Brent Bluth

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

_

TEDDIEK.BE11

NOTARY PUBUC-STATE Of UTAH
14175 SOUTH REDWOOO R&
_BUJR=OAlS UT 84065_
HyCdmm. Exp. 09/02/2007

Notary Public

3

^

day of April, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
BRENT BLUTH was served via U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid on the
April, 2005 to the following:
David K. Smith
6925 Union Park Center
Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047

4

day of

ATTACHMENT "E"
Defendant's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
Affidavit of Taylor Smith
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Utah State Bar No. 2993
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763
Attorney for Defendant: TAYLOR SMITH and WALLINGFORD
DEVELOPMENT, INC., A Utah Corporation.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,

)

)

REPLY TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

)

TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINFORD DEVELOPMENT,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

)

Case No. 040914276

)

Honorable Judith Atherton

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant, TAYLOR SMITH, for himself and on behalf of
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and through Counsel,
respectfully replies to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
Page 1 of 6

CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff filed its claim for relief against the Defendant seeking a money judgment for
$11,385.62 for water service allegedly requested by the Defendant from the Plaintiff from
approximately July 1, 1999 to October 2, 2001.
2. The water provided was on a parking strip owned by Bluffdale City Corporation.
3. Plaintiffs seek judgment on the basis of three causes of actions or theories for relief.
The first theory asserted is breach of contract. The second theory for relief is based upon the
allegation of unjust enrichment. The third theory for relief is based upon an implied promise to
pay.
4. At no time did the Defendants enter into any written contract or agreement to pay for
water provided to the city's parking strip.
5. Defendants specifically aver in Taylor Smith's affidavit that he never entered into any
oral agreement or contract, or engage in any activity that might be construed as consent for the
city to provide water to the parking strip for which he or Wallingford Development might be
responsible.
6. At no time did the Defendants offer to pay or in any way lead the city with any
presumption that they would pay if the city provided water to the parking strip in question.
7. Inasmuch as the water provided by the city to its own parking strip, it is difficult to
conclude that the defendant was unjustly enriched by the city's service of water.
8. After a period of several months, the city on its own volition, terminated water service
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to the parking strip.

ARGUMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE
WHERE THERE ARE ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACT
It is well settled law that summary judgment cannot be granted in a matter where there are
issues of material disputed fac which remain in any case. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. V. Abbott,
562 P2d 191 (Utah , 1975). A summary judgment motion should only be granted when all of the
facts entitling the moving party to a judgment are clearly established or admitted. Sorenson v.
Beers, 585 P2d 485 (Utah, 1979)
The court is prohibited from considering weight to be given any fact or the credibility of
any witness's statement given in support of a motion for summary judgment; the court's job is to
simply determine that no material fact relevant to the granting of the motion is disputed.
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,431 P2d 126 (1967)
A material issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts on record, reasonable minds
could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the standards raised on the issue of
whether medical malpractice occurred on the part of the Defendant or not. Jackson v. Dubney,
645 P2d 613 (Utah, 1982)
In a motion for summary judgment the adverse party is entitled to have the co urt survey
the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
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to that adverse party. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297 (1953), Bowen
v. Riverton City, 656 P2d 434 (Utah. 1982)
It takes only one sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of the
controversy to create an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v.
Adams, 542 P2d 191 (Utah, 1975).

THERE ARE NUMEROUS ISSUES OF FACT WHICH REQUIRE A
DECISION BY THE TRIER OF FACT BEFORE THE CASE
CAN BE RESOLVED AND WHICH PRECLUDE A RULING BY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1. The Plaintiff asserts that there is a breach of contract. No physical evidence has been
produced to suggest that there was ever a written agreement between the parties that would
require the Defendants would pay for water provided by the Plaintiff for the city's own parking
strip.
2. The Plaintiff asserts that there was an implied contract to provide water service.
Again, the Defendant, in his affidavit, denies that either he or Wallingford Development, Inc.
ever agreed verbally either implicitly or explicitly to pay for water provided by Bluffdale to the
city's parking strip.
3. The Plaintiff attempts, by letter dated September 9, 1999, some three months after the
water began to be supplied to the parking strip, to suggest that it implies that the defendant as
alleged developers are responsible for the water "until each lot has its own irrigation system."
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4. This was never agreed to by the Defendants, and in fact the Defendants deny that they
agreed to such a proposal, and specifically allege they wrote to Bluffdale City advising them they
were not going to be responsible for any water supplied to the city's parking strips.
5. The Defendants further aver in their affidavit, they were not owners of Heritage
Industrial Park, nor signers of the Restrictive Covenants.
6. The Defendants further allege that there was a global settlement reached between SK
Development and Bluffdale City on May 20, 2004 which renders the Plaintiffs lawsuit moot.
7. As to each theory for relief there remain issues of disputed fact to preclude any entry
of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

There are significant issues of fact which remain in dispute in this case and which would
preclude the granting of a summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and the case scheduled for
trial.
DATED this / /

day of May, 2005.

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS'
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Counsel for the
Plaintiff, this / / day of May, 2005, addressed as follows:
DALE GARDINER
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
Attorneys at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

£c

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Utah State Bar No. 2993
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
Facsimile: (801) 566-8763

?ttiai Disrsif cr cooay
Third Judicial District

^
By,

2 0 2005

SALT LAKE COUNT
Deputy Gtefk"

Attorney for Defendant: TAYLOR SMITH and WALLINGFORD
DEVELOPMENT, INC., A Utah Corporation.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF TAYLOR SMITH
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
TAYLOR SMITH, an individual; and
WALLINFORD DEVELOPMENT,
INC., a Utah Corporation,

Case No. 040914276
Honorable Judith Atherton

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

: ss.

COMES NOW the Defendant, TAYLOR SMITH, for himself and on behalf of
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WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, as follows:
1. Taylor Smith, having been first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
2. I am over the age of 21 years, and have personal knowledge of the matters set forth
herein, and can competently testify thereto.
3. At no time did I ever request on behalf of myself or WaUingford Development water
service from the Plaintiff, Bluffdale City, a Municipal Corporation for parking strips, the
watering of which Plaintiff seeks recovery from the Defendants.
4. I never agreed to pay for the water provided to the parking strips in question.
5. I was approached several times by representatives of Bluffdale City Corporation to
sign an agreement to set a meter and to pay for water on the parking strips and I refused each
time.
6. The letter dated September 9,1999 from Shane C. Jones to myself was sent after I
had refused to agree to enter into any agreement for payment of water on the parking strips. I
never consented to nor agreed to Mr. Jones' "understanding."
7. I also believe that I had personally told Mr. Jones that I refused to pay for any water.
In any event, after I refused to pay for watering the parking strips. Why did they not shut off the
water after no payment rather than leaving on for years after turning it on?
8. The portion of the document as Exhibit B to Shane C. Jones' Affidavit, numbered
pages 28 and 29 does not represent an agreement between Bluffdale City and myself. It
represents Restrictive Covenants of which WaUingford Dvelopment, Inc. was a joint party with
SK Development, Inc. Bluffdale City, however, was not a party to the Restrictive Covenants.
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9. The Restrictive Covenants are between individual owners of the property and the
Industrial Park Owners' Association, and refers to individual owners taking responsibility for the
park strips owned by them or in front of their properties, and not Bluffdale City.
10. Wallingford Development, Inc., and SK Development, Inc. Were the owners of
Heritage Industrial Park, and joint signators on the Restrictive Covenants.
11. The parking strips in question for which water was provided belonged to and was
operated by Bluffdale City Corporation.
12. Any requirements for landscaping and maintaining the park strips were the sole
obligation of SK Development, and were bonded for by SK Development, Inc. and not by your
affiants.
13. There is a "global settlement" agreement dated May 20, 2004 between SK
Development, Inc. And Bluffdale, which is part of the exhibit attached to Defendants' Responses
to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, which Defendant believes renders the issues
presented in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment moot.
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SrtsuM^

SUBSCRIBED and Sworn

this i ' day
day of
of May, 2005.

My Commission Expires:
•—

[REPUBLIC, Residing at
Salt Lake County, Utah 84111

OAVIOK SMITH
NOTARY PUBLIC'STATE t* UTAH
M2S UNION PARK CENTER STE 600
MJDVALE UT 84047
COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04-21-2007
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
TAYLOR SMITH IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to Counsel for the Plaintiff, this ' * d a y of May, 2005, addressed as follows:

DALE GARDINER
GRAIG R. KLEINMAN
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER
Attorneys at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

CX^
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
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ATTACHMENT "F"
Jones letter of September 9.1999
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BLUFFDALE CITY
14175 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD •

BLUFFDALE, UTAH 84065

(801) 254-2200

September 9, 1999
Mr. Taylor Smith
Lexington Construction
830 West 14600 South
Bluffdale, UT 84065
RE:

STATUS OF WATER METER FOR IRRIGATION OF PARK STRIPS

Dear Mr. Smith,
The City has installed a water meter to measure the amount of water that is being used to
irrigate the park strips throughout the various phases of Heritage Industrial Park. It is our
understanding that a connection fee for this meter has not and it will not be collected but
that you as the developer will be responsible to pay for the water that is used until each
lot has its own irrigation system and the system serving the complete development can be
abandoned.
Sincerely,

Shane C. JorWP.E.
Bluffdale CftyTSngineer/Building Official
C \MD\dcv\h critagcindustriaJparkWiitLirirri^atioiimdtCf

ATTACHMENT "Gr
Protective Covenants
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AFTER RECORDING, RETURN TUSK DEVELOPMENT, INC.
P.O. BOX 95005
SOUTH JORDAN, UT 84095-5005

\0

0RI6INAL

DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
FOR HERITAGE INDUSTRIAL PARK

THIS DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR HERITAGE
INDUSTRIAL PARK (the "Declaration"), is made this 17th day of October, 1997, by S K
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation, and WALLJNGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC,
a Utah Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Declarant").

WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Declarant is the fee simple owner of certain real property located in Bluffdale,
Salt Lake County, Utah and being more particularly described in Exhibit"A" attached hereto and
by this reference made a part hereof (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"); and
WHEREAS, the Property is known as Phase One of "Heritage Industrial Park" (hereinafter
referred to as the "Park"); and
WHEREAS, Declarant intends to own and to develop portions of the Park itself and/or to
convey portions of the Park to other persons or entities for development, all in accordance with
certain conditions, covenants and restrictions pertaining to the ownership and development of the
portions of the Park; and
WHEREAS, Declarant desires to subject initially the Property to certain conditions,
covenants and restrictions as more particularly hereinafter set forth, and Declarant intends in the
future to subject additional portions of the Park to the conditions, covenants, and restrictions of this
Declaration.
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby subjects the Property, to certain protective
covenants, said protective covenants being more particularly set forth as follows:
L

DEFINITIONS
The following works of art and terms when used or referred to in this Declaration or any
amendment or supplement hereto or modifications hereof (unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise) shall have the following meanings:

(a.)

"Architectural Review Committee shall mean and refer to a committee

but not limited to: front, side and rear yard setback area will be planted and
landscaped according to an approved plan3•

Plant Material: The basic plant materials to provide overall landscape continuity are
trees, shrubbery, groundcover and lawn. The Architectural Review Committee has
approved Blue Spruce and Maple trees. As a rule, all trees should be of the mioimum
six of 2 V* * caliper for Maple trees and six (6) feet for Blue Spruce. The basic lawn
plantings will be supplemented by appropriate trees, shrubs and groundcover. Plants
will be arranged to highlight building entries, soften and provide scale to building
masses and site development. To ensure an adequate buffer, additional landscape
easements (setbacks) may be required of parcels adjacent to main entries. Plant
species prohibited by the ordinances of Bluffdale City shall not be used.

4.

Site Yard Landscaping: Typical side yard landscaping will consist of accent framing
or screening, depending on specific circumstances. Side yard areas will consist of
informal tree planting of approved species; and intermittent screening of at least six
(6) feet high on other property line is required to screen any service areas. This can
be accomplished through the use of a combination of shrubs of approved species and
mounding.

5.

Landscaping Mounding: Where mounding or earth contouring is required, smooth
transition with soft natural forms are desired. Trees are not to be planted directly on
top of mounds. Berming or mounding is encouraged where possible.

6.

Suggested Plant Materials: To maintain continuity and a sense of order, the plant
list will comply with the American National Standards Institutes (ANSI) 60.1 Nursery
Stock design as established by the American Association of Nurserymen.

7.

Landscape Maintenance: It js the responsibility of each Owner, at the Owner's
expense, to maintain its individual Commercial Site, including; but not limited to,
irrigation, lawn mowing, tree and shrub trimming (including replacement ofdead trees
or shrubs), fertilization and weed and insect control.

IRRIGATION
It is the responsibility of the individual Owner to provide irrigation for all planting areas, all
landscaping including City parkstrips of its Commercial Site. The irrigation system will
provide 100 % coverage and will use water which will not cause rust staining on paving,
walls and so on.
In area adjacent to street rights-of-way, it is the responsibility of the Owner to install the
sprinkler irrigation system that provides coverage to the back of curb for the street right-ofway. By doing this, a complete and uniform irrigation system is provided. An Irrigation
Layout must be submitted to the Architectural Review Committee for approval for each
Commercial Site as a part of the Plan Review Process.
The Owner shall record a covenant providing that the placement of such irrigation system in
-28-

any easement orright-of-waydedicated to a governmental entity is inferior to the rights of
cable television companies, Bluffdale City and all utility companies fTJtilities") in such
easements or rights-of-way and that such Utilities shall have no duty to repair, replace or
restore any irrigation system located therein.
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of Utah. Venue shall be proper only in the District Court for the Third Judicial District or the Circuit
Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Salt Lake County, Utah.
31.

SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS

This Declaration shall be binding upon, and shall insure to the benefit of Declarant, the
Architectural Review Committee and Owners and the respective successors and assigns ofDeclarant,
the Architectural Review Committee and Owners.
JN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the Declarant herein, has hereunto set
its hand this 17th day of October, 1997.
"DECLARANT"
S K DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation
By:_
Steven E. Sinner, President
WALLINGFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah
Corporation

Bv: ^~FT^(/T\
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S, Taylor Smith, President
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State of UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this 17th day of October, 1997,
by Steven E. Sinner, personally known to me to be the President of SK Development, Inc., a Utah
Corporation.
^nAUtdl&MA)
»m
» * *
GAYE HUSBAND BROWB* k
ARY PUBLIC
Notary Public
I
State of Utah

I

f

My

My C d m r a Expres Mar2Z200O F
—
99XSoChoe9nVteyScxifriJontenUt84095f
^pi i»»
Commis^Jn^^fyc^i • v>*

Residing at:

S&atk Jordm . UT

MaM XL Mn
[Notary Seal]

State of UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this 17°* day of October, 1997,
by S. Taylor Smith, personally known to me to be the President of Wallingford Development,
Inc., a Utah Corporation.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

Marsha ^. loon

South \Jo&dav). LUah

rNolaraSeaH m m r *»

A

GAYE HUSBASD BROWER j
Notary Public
State of Utah
%ConrmBq*esMar22 2000
9930 So Cha9en Way Sex* Jordan Ut 84096
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